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Abstract
In an effort to increase competition and decrease price, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria recently began asking some grant recipients to use international
competitive bidding processes for certain drug purchases. Unfortunately, for countries like Kenya,
this request has caused more harm than good. After awarding the tender for its annual supply of
the anti-malarial artemether-lumefantrine to the lowest bidder, Ajanta Pharma, Kenya experienced
wide stock-outs in part due to the company's inability to supply the order in full and on time. Similar
problems could arise in Uganda. Despite Kenya's experience, Uganda has awarded its next tender
for artemether-lumefantrine to Ajanta Pharma. Uganda is already facing wide stock-outs and risks
exacerbating an already dire situation the longer it takes to fulfil the procurement contract. A
tender process based primarily on price cannot account for a company's ability to consistently
supply sufficient product in time.
Background
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GFATM) spends millions of dollars every year to procure
medicines for patients in developing countries [1]. Yet
GFATM procurement policies that encourage grant recipi-
ents to procure products based largely on price alone has
placed less value on quality and reliability of supply. This
has led to stock-outs and questionable tenders that may
cost malaria control programmes more than is saved
through open tenders.
In short, GFATM is at times placing minor price reduc-
tions of a medicine above the value of health.
In countries like Kenya, where as many as 13 million peo-
ple contract malaria every year and an estimated 48,000
die [2], the successful procurement and distribution of
anti-malarial drugs is a matter of life and death. Given the
perennial malaria risk in Kenya, drugs should always be
available in all clinics. GFATM has allocated millions of
dollars for the procurement of life-saving medicines, and
by its own measures has done a reasonably good job
ensuring that the drugs reach the right people. But its
recent five-year internal evaluation acknowledges insuffi-
cient accountability of how developing countries use this
money, leading to inefficient, sometimes wasteful spend-
ing [3]. In addition, inconsistent reporting by grant recip-
ients results in unreliable data, which compounds the
problem [4].
Discussion
The Grant-Giver
GFATM is a "financing" rather than an "implementing"
body. It does not directly procure drugs, instead it invites
"country coordinating mechanisms" (CCM), which may
include "broad representation from governments, NGOs,
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civil society, multilateral and bilateral agencies and the
private sector," to submit grant proposals [5].
Once approved, money is disbursed in tranches to the
CCM-designated "principal recipient" (PR), who then
channels money to sub-recipients. A Ministry of Health or
other body may negotiate directly with a pharmaceutical
company or contract with logistics firms who offer exper-
tise in procurement. GFATM hires "local fund agents"
(LFAs), usually one per grant-receiving country, who are
responsible for overseeing, verifying and reporting on
grant performance.
GFATM encourages its PRs to purchase drugs "in a manner
that achieves the lowest possible price for products of
assured quality" through competitive purchasing from
qualified manufacturers and suppliers [6]. GFATM allows
the procurement of drugs not yet approved by the World
Health Organization (WHO) or a stringent regulatory
authority (SRA) where there are fewer than two drugs
available that meet one or both of these standards; these
drugs should only be procured under exceptional circum-
stances since they have not yet passed the highest quality
assessments and are possibly of inferior quality.
In the case of anti-malarial drugs, Novartis AG was the
first company to produce a WHO-prequalified and SRA-
approved artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT);
called Coartem®, it is a fixed-dose combination of arte-
mether-lumefantrine (ALU). Today, there are eight forms
of ACT approved by an SRA or the WHO, including Ajanta
Pharma's ALU - Artefan®. For several years, GFATM's PRs
contracted directly with the supplier. To increase competi-
tion, in 2007, GFATM asked some grant recipients to use
international competitive bidding processes for certain
drug purchases [7].
The Kenya case
GFATM required that Kenya purchase seventy-five percent
of its annual order of ALU, the recommended first-line
treatment for uncomplicated malaria in Kenya, through
an international open tender [7]. In line with GFATM pol-
icies, in May 2008, the Kenya Medical Supplies Agency--a
GFATM sub-recipient--awarded a $12.3 million tender to
Ajanta Pharma, the lowest bidder, whose ALU was, at the
time, registered by GFATM as a Ci (submitted to WHO or
an SRA for approval, but not yet approved). Tender docu-
ments were not made available to the authors; however,
industry and academic sources indicate that the difference
between Ajanta's tendered price and rival tenders was sub-
stantial, at around forty percent. The substantial cost sav-
ings from the lower bid could mitigate the risk of
awarding the tender to a relatively unknown company.
On the other hand, procurement agents should have
questioned how realistic the pricing was and whether or
not the company would be able to deliver at such a low
cost. The contract stipulated that Ajanta would supply 13
million doses of Artefan in three phases to begin in Octo-
ber 2008 [7] at the latest, although it was widely expected
that delivery would begin earlier [8].
By mid 2008, Kenya was experiencing wide stock-outs of
ALU and had to place emergency orders to the President's
Malaria Initiative (PMI) [9]. While PMI was able to supply
the country with nearly 1.3 million doses of Coartem over
July and August, Kenya's drug shortage remained.
A delayed and confusing tendering process was partly to
blame for the ongoing stock-outs, but these were exacer-
bated and prolonged by Ajanta Pharma's inability to fulfil
its contract and supply Artefan in sufficient quantities. It
is possible that Ajanta would have been able to fulfil its
tender for Kenya, had the Kenyan Government not
delayed procurement, since Ajanta probably redirected
some of its product to fulfil other contracts in the mean-
time; regardless, it managed its own supply poorly. Addi-
tionally, Kenyan sources tell the authors that because the
product was a Ci (and hence not WHO prequalified),
batch-quality testing was undertaken, which further
delayed delivery. Ajanta delivered its first consignment on
December 31, 2008--at least three months late. In addi-
tion, the amount that arrived was well below the expected
monthly requirement, and some of the blister packages
were only partially filled [10].
In March 2009, WHO issued a Notice of Concern (NOC)
against Ajanta Pharma following an inspection of the
company's production plant, which "revealed several
major deviations from the WHO GMP [Good Manufac-
turing Practices] standards [11]". WHO's NOC
announced the withholding of prequalification of any
new Ajanta products until the deviations were satisfacto-
rily addressed and could also consider suspending
Ajanta's products that were currently listed as prequali-
fied. Fortunately for Ajanta, the NOC has since been with-
drawn [12].
History lessons in Uganda
Despite Kenya's experience, it seems Ajanta's logistical
failures have not influenced GFATM policy in neighbour-
ing Uganda.
In early March 2009, Uganda issued an international
open tender for its annual ALU supply. Fourteen compa-
nies took part, including Novartis, the large Indian gener-
ics company Cipla, and Kenya-based Cosmos (with the
lowest bid) [13].
With WHO's drug quality concerns still outstanding,
Uganda's Ministry of Health announced on May 8th that
Ajanta was the "best evaluated bidder" [14]. Though
Uganda's Health Minister, Stephen Malinga, was "awareMalaria Journal 2009, 8:305 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/305
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of the Kenyan situation," he told the Observer, a Ugandan
newspaper, that Ajanta had "explained" itself and the
Ministry had concluded Kenya's problems were "caused
by the Kenya Government itself" [15]. The Ministry
intended to sign a contract within five to ten days. A Ugan-
dan news source indicated that as of early November
2009, the tender was awarded to Ajanta Pharma and Arte-
fan would replace Coartem [16]. As of December 2009, it
was unclear whether orders had actually been placed and
when Ajanta was scheduled to deliver product. The delays
in awarding the tender and issuing the orders have already
contributed to greater shortages of ACT in Uganda.
All this leaves lingering questions about Uganda's actions;
awarding a contract not to the lowest bidder or to the one
with a reliable history. Tender documents on file with the
authors reveal that Ajanta's tendered price was approxi-
mately four percent below that of Novartis AG, therefore
there is little apparent cost mitigation to account for the
added risk of procuring from a company with a poor
record of delivery and an outstanding NOC at the time the
open tender was issued. Furthermore, the extent to which
GFATM exercises oversight and demands greater account-
ability over such tenders is questionable. In its guidelines,
GFATM suggests PRs are responsible for oversight along
the supply chain, but does not specify if or how GFATM
itself is responsible, which may have contributed to the
cases presented here [17].
The U.S. Government Accountability Office reported that
numerous sources have raised "concerns about the quality
of grant monitoring and reporting" provided by GFATM's
LFAs, particularly on "their ability to assess and verify
recipients' procurement capacity and program implemen-
tation." GFATM had limited access to the information it
needed to manage and oversee LFAs because it did not
require "systematic assessments" of their performance
[18].
Conclusions
So, is price king? GFATM is one of the most successful
mechanisms for supporting malaria control programmes
and is more open and transparent than almost any other
multilateral or bilateral programme, but significant pro-
curement policy problems within GFATM must be
urgently addressed. Competition among suppliers will
lower prices and may raise quality, but only if minimum
standards are required. However, GFATM policies that
have pushed competition ahead of drug quality or con-
sistency of supply demonstrate that this does not always
happen in practice. Indeed, one could argue that as much
as Uganda's current procurement approach appears mis-
guided, it is in fact in compliance with GFATM policies.
In response to queries from the authors concerning the
status of medicines on GFATM's procurement list after
WHO has issued an NOC, GFATM representatives indi-
cated that they are in 'continued dialogue' with WHO, but
would not de-list a medicine as long as it remained on the
WHO prequalification list. However, while a WHO NOC
reports on drug quality, it does not report on the ability of
a manufacturer to deliver drugs, an issue that should be of
concern to GFATM.
A tender process based primarily on price cannot account
for a company's ability to consistently supply sufficient
product in time. GFATM and its donors should insist on
an assessment of the lives lost and the socioeconomic cost
of Kenya's stock-out, including the cost of the emergency
procurements made by the PMI. And where possible,
assess how Ajanta Pharma's failures contributed to this
problem.
A possible longer-term solution could be to circumvent
national tendering by PRs, and instead have donors issue
tenders, manage funds and deliver drugs directly to recip-
ient countries. Such a system, however, is not only patron-
izing toward disease endemic countries, reducing their
level of responsibility for tendering and procurement, but
could also limit these countries' long-term ability to man-
age sustainable disease control programs. Based on
Kenya's experience, it would be preferable for donors to
instead issue clear procurement guidelines, giving guid-
ance on considerations of price and logistics. Such a sys-
tem should also be accompanied by a global audit of
GFATM tenders and procurement. Given the fact that glo-
bal taxpayer funds are used to support such tenders, a fully
transparent and public audit of drug tendering and pro-
curement should be instituted. Furthermore, in order to
ensure improved tendering, tenders and details of pro-
curement decisions, including drug prices, should be
more transparent. Currently, some companies, with good
intentions, publicise their product prices prior to the issu-
ance of tenders, which allows other companies to benefit
from this information when submitting their own confi-
dential bids. A system that is more consistent with the
principles of fair competition would discourage compa-
nies from publicising prices ahead of tenders and would
insist on full transparency of these tenders once awarded.
Lastly, to achieve improved accountability for awarded
tenders, penalties for suppliers, PRs and LFAs should be
instituted.
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